Hub-and-Spoke or Else? Free Trade Agreements in the Enlarged EU – A Gravity Model Estimate. CEPS ENEPRI Working Papers No. 37, 1 June 2005 by De Benedictis, Luca et al.
Place du Congrès 1 • B-1000 Brussels • Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 • Fax: (32.2) 219.41.51 • VAT: BE 424.123.986 
e-mail: info@enepri.org • website: http://www.enepri.org 
EUROPEAN NETWORK OF 
ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH 
INSTITUTES 
WORKING PAPER NO. 37/JUNE 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
HUB-AND-SPOKE OR ELSE? 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE ENLARGED EU 
 
A GRAVITY MODEL ESTIMATE 
 
LUCA DE BENEDICTIS 
ROBERTA DE SANTIS 
CLAUDIO VICARELLI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 92-9079-571-9 
AVAILABLE FOR FREE DOWNLOADING FROM THE ENEPRI WEBSITE (HTTP://WWW.ENEPRI.ORG) 
OR THE CEPS WEBSITE (WWW.CEPS.BE)  
© COPYRIGHT 2005, LUCA DE BENEDICTIS, ROBERTA DE SANTIS AND CLAUDIO VICARELLI 
 
  
Hub-and-Spoke or Else? 
Free Trade Agreements in the Enlarged EU 
A Gravity Model Estimate 
ENEPRI Working Paper No. 37/June 2005 
Luca De Benedictis*, Roberta De Santis** and Claudio Vicarelli** 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of the EU’s eastern enlargement on the trade 
patterns of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) that joined the Union in May 
2004. In particular, the paper investigates whether and how the EU’s free trade agreements 
(FTAs) with the CEECs have affected centre-periphery and intra-periphery trade flows. It also 
evaluates whether the EU-membership factor has had the added positive effects on exports from 
the CEECs as anticipated. 
The analysis focuses on bilateral trade flows between eight CEECs and the EU-23, for which a 
gravity equation is estimated using a system GMM dynamic panel data approach. The results 
support the assumptions that gravity forces and ‘persistence effects’ do indeed matter. With 
respect to the effect of FTAs, evidence is found that FTAs between EU countries and CEECs 
matter. Yet there is also evidence that the presence of intra-periphery agreements have helped to 
expand intra-periphery trade and limit the emergence of a hub-and-spoke relationship between 
the EU and the CEECs. 
These results have important policy implications for the trade strategy of EU candidate 
countries in south-eastern Europe as well as in the southern Mediterranean. According to the 
empirical results, these countries should move towards a regional free trade area as exemplified 
by the Central European Free Trade Agreement and the Baltic Free Trade Agreement to avoid 
hub-and-spoke effects. 
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Hub-and-Spoke or Else? 
Free Trade Agreements in the Enlarged EU 
A Gravity Model Estimate 
ENEPRI Working Paper No. 37/June 2005 
Luca De Benedictis, Roberta De Santis and Claudio Vicarelli 
Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of the EU’s eastern enlargement on the trade 
patterns of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)
1  that joined the EU in May 
2004. In particular, the paper investigates whether and how the EU free trade agreements 
(FTAs) with the CEECs affected centre-peripheral and intra-peripheral trade flows. It also 
evaluates whether the prospect of joining the EU had the added positive effects on the export 
flows of the CEECs that had been anticipated. 
Although the formal beginning of negotiations for the EU’s enlargement is more recent, to some 
extent the CEEC accession process began in the early 1990s, shortly after the free market 
system got under way. During that period and afterwards the acceding countries signed bilateral 
agreements with the EU (i.e. the Europe [Association] Agreements), which represented an 
advance in the path towards integration through stipulating a progressive liberalisation of trade. 
It is worth recalling that in 1992, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland 
established the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and in 1996 Slovenia joined 
CEFTA as a full member. In 1994, the Baltic Free Trade Agreement (BAFTA) also entered into 
force. In addition, the CEECs have signed several bilateral trade agreements among themselves.  
Thus the paper explores whether the progressive integration of the CEECs within the Union and 
among themselves has involved not only increased trading with the 15 EU member states prior 
to accession (EU-15), but also a geographical restructuring of the trade flows across the EU 
(relating to both the centre and the periphery). In particular, we investigate whether and how the 
FTAs signed by CEECs
 have exerted an impact on centre-peripheral and intra-peripheral trade 
relationships. We especially consider whether there a ‘hub-and-spoke’ trade relationship has 
emerged between the CEECs and the EU as a result of the bilateral FTAs. 
The literature on the effects of trading blocs typically focuses on the Vinerian model of trade 
creation and trade diversion effects, while the impact of economic integration and the creation 
of trade blocs on intra-bloc trade has typically received minor attention. Here the bilateral trade 
flows between the eight CEECs and the EU-23 (comprising the EU-15 plus the CEECs as 
partner countries) are analysed. We estimate a gravity equation using a system GMM dynamic 
panel data approach.  
The paper is organised as follows. The first section surveys theory and empirics. The path 
towards integration through stipulating a progressive liberalisation of trade for the CEECs is 
briefly analysed in section 2. Section 3 describes the estimated equation, the empirical strategy 
and the data. The results are presented in section 4, followed by the conclusions. 
                                                 
1 The acronym CEECs is used hereafter to refer to the eight Central and Eastern European countries that 
joined the EU in May 2004: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. 2 | DE BENEDICTIS, DE SANTIS & VICARELLI 
 
1.  A review of the literature on regional integration in Eastern Europe 
In the last 10 years, gravity models have been widely used in empirical studies of integration 
processes to explore the main changes in geographical trade patterns and to analyse the effects 
of FTAs, regional trade agreements (RTAs), and currency unions (CU) on trade flows.  
After 1991, special attention in the literature on gravity models was given to estimating the 
potential trade flows between the countries belonging to the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), the EU, the CEECs and the Baltic countries. (See for example Baldwin & Portes, 1997; 
Gros & Gonciarz, 1996; Brenton & Di Mauro, 1999; Nilsson, 2000; Lasser & Schrader, 2002; 
and Brenton & Manzocchi, 2002). 
Most of the above-mentioned studies found out that the RTAs (i.e. the Europe Agreements) put 
into place to prepare the transition countries for accession to the EU prompted substantial 
growth in EU-CEEC trade flows (i.e. regional dummies have positive and significant 
coefficients). Therefore, most of the adjustments in trade flows have already occurred and the 
expected further effects arising from the completion of EU enlargement will be modest. 
In the empirical literature on EU enlargement, however, only minor attention has been paid to 
the study of the geographical restructuring of the trade flows arising from the entry into force of 
RTAs and FTAs among the EU-15 and the new member states. 
Martin & Turrion (2001) analyse the determinants of trade patterns between the CEECs and the 
OECD countries since the former began the processes of transition and opening up within the 
framework of the Europe Agreements with the EU. To anticipate the trade impacts of their 
accession to the EU, the authors estimate a gravity model for a set of countries consisting of the 
EU members, the CEECs and the other members of the OECD (by way of a control area). The 
results confirm that the Europe Agreements have led to a preferential expansion of exchanges 
between the EU and the CEECs. In fact, as regards regional dummies, they find that the increase 
in the export shares of the CEECs in the EU is sharper that the increase of those of third 
countries (the coefficient of the dummies are 2.38 and 1.35 respectively). 
The gravity model estimates by Laaser & Schrader (2002) suggest that in the specific cases of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, regional integration is much more intense than normally 
observed. The authors observe that the role of distance (and the costs of transport) for the Baltic 
countries is much more important in shaping their regional trade patterns than institutional 
integration with the EU through the Europe Agreements. Their estimates show that the process 
of EU association was not a determinant, despite the expectation that the trade agreements with 
the EU would have fostered Baltic-EU trade flows, while regional determinants dominated. 
Hence they conclude that the process of European integration mainly runs through neighbouring 
Baltic countries and that the transport system dominates the trade regime by shaping trade flows 
in the region (the coefficient of distance is close to 1 in all the estimates). 
Damijan & Masten (2002) explore the time-dependent efficiency of FTAs in a panel framework 
using static and dynamic model specifications. They show that trade liberalisation per se needs 
time to become efficient. Using the illustrative case of the rapid expansion of Slovenian imports 
in the period 1993-98 from the other CEFTA member countries, the paper demonstrates that 
tariff reductions become effective in the second to third year after the FTA came into force. 
Regarding the effect of the CEFTA, the analysis revealed that being a party to the CEFTA 
increased the exports of the other CEECs towards Slovenia by 18.5%. 
Paas (2003) finds that the pattern of bilateral trade flows within the countries involved in EU 
enlargement is in accordance with the normal rules of gravitation. He also finds that there are 
statistically significant spatial biases caused by the trade relationship between the countries in 
the Baltic region, the border countries and the EU candidate countries. The East-West trade HUB-AND-SPOKE OR ELSE? FTAS IN AN ENLARGED EU | 3 
 
relationships are still rather weakly developed and there is a statistically significant difference in 
international trade patterns between the two groups: bilateral trade relations between the EU-15 
member states and the CEECs are still less developed than trade relations among the EU-15. 
Adam et al. (2003) explore the effectiveness of the CEFTA and BAFTA. Estimates from a 
gravity model and bilateral trade data support the view that both of these agreements helped 
expand regional trade and limit the emergence of a hub-and-spoke relationship between the 
CEECs and the EU. In the regression, all the preferential trade agreement variables are positive 
and statistically significant. The authors conclude that all the agreements were trade-creating for 
their members. Results showed the BAFTA to be more effective than the CEFTA and 
interestingly, the parameter estimate for the Europe Agreements is smaller than for either the 
CEFTA or BAFTA. Thus, the bulk of the increase in EU-CEEC trade was owing to a return to 
normal trading patterns rather than to specific trade advantages offered by Europe Agreements. 
2.  EU enlargement and the CEECs 
At the end of the EU enlargement process, the new members will embark on the highest stage of 
economic integration with the EU: they will join economic and monetary union (EMU), as no 
opt-out clause is allowed for new entrants. In May 2004, the new members entered the EU at the 
level of the Single Market. Participation in the EMU from the start of accession was not 
considered possible given that most of the acceding countries did not yet fulfil the convergence 
criteria provided by the Maastricht Treaty.
2  
In the case of EU enlargement, we have to deal with the standard effects of regional integration, 
pure trade effects, plus a specific aspect: the EU-membership factor. Pure trade effects are the 
traditional trade impacts of economic integration that occur through trade creation and trade 
diversion. Trade creation refers to increases in trade that generate new economic activity, 
whereas trade diversion refers to the redirection of existing trade as a result of changes in tariffs 
and other barriers owing to a regional customs union. EU membership effects are the positive 
effects exerted on trade and economic activity by the participation in European Single Market. 
2.1  RTAs and ETAs in the enlarged Union: Hub-and-spoke or else? 
With respect to the pure trade effects, it should be recalled that the EU concluded Europe 
Agreements with the CEECs during the 1990s. That implies that an asymmetric tariff reduction 
has taken place in trade between the EU and the CEECs. Since 1997, the EU has eliminated 
practically all tariffs (except on agricultural and other sensitive products) on imports from the 
CEECs. Since joining the EU in 2004, the CEECs have entered the EU’s customs union 
(Common External Tariff and Common Commercial Policy), thus participating in the Single 
Market and the abolition of border controls.  
Although the trade components of the Europe Agreements with some CEECs went into effect 
on different dates – ranging from 1992 (for former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland) to 
1996 (for Slovenia) – schedules for the elimination of duties and non-tariff barriers on industrial 
products had one important component in common. They all had 1 January 2002 as the date to 
complete the process of liberalisation. 
                                                 
2 The statement by the ECOFIN Council of 7 November 2000 on the implications of the accession 
process upon the exchange rate arrangements in the acceding countries identified three distinct stages for 
the full monetary integration of candidate countries. These stages are: i) the pre-accession stage (free 
choice of an exchange rate regime); ii) the accession stage (new member states shall treat their exchange 
rate policy as “a matter of common interest” [EC Treaty Art. 124]); and iii) after accession the new 
member countries are expected to join the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II).  4 | DE BENEDICTIS, DE SANTIS & VICARELLI 
 
Europe Agreements are bilateral agreements between the EU and individual applicant countries, 
which are shown in Table 1. It should be emphasised that these agreements do not exist between 
applicant countries. The Europe Agreements thus could have led to the emergence of the so-
called ‘hub-and-spoke’ pattern, creating trade between the EU and each applicant country 
separately, while discouraging trade among the applicant states.  
Table 1. Free trade agreements 
  Date of entry into force 
 CMEA  EU  GSP  CEFTA  BAFTA  OECD  WTO EA 
CZ  1 Jan 1949  1991  1 Mar 1993 –  21 Dec 1995  1 Jan 1995  1 Mar 1992
EE  1 Jan 1949  1992  –  1 Apr 1994  –  13 Nov 1999  1 Jan 1995 
HU  1 Jan 1949  1990  1 Mar 1993 –  7 May 1996  1 July 1995  1 Mar 1992
LV  1 Jan 1949  1992  –  1 Apr 1994  –  10 Feb 1999  1 Jan 1995 
LT  1 Jan 1949  1992  –  1 Apr 1994  –  31 May 2001  1 Jan 1995 
PL  1 Jan 1949  1990  1 Mar 1993 –  22 Nov 1996  1 Jul 1995  1 Mar 1992
SL  1 Jan 1949  1991  1 Mar 1993 –  14 Dec 2000  1 Jan 1995  1 Mar 1992
SI  –  1980*  1 Jan 1996  –  –  30 Jul 1995  1 Jan 1997 
* Slovenia retained preferential status for its exports under the so-called ‘autonomous trade preferences’ granted by 
the EU to former Yugoslavia in the 1980 Cooperation Agreement. 
Notes: CMEA = Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; GSP = Generalised System of Preferences; CEFTA = 
Central European Free Trade Area; BAFTA = Baltic Free Trade Agreement; EA = Europe Agreement 
Source: WTO (retrieved from http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm). 
Several CEECS have also signed free trade agreements among themselves (Tables 1 and 2). The 
first preferential agreement among the CEECs was the CEFTA,
3 which entered into force in 
1993. Its membership gradually expanded over time. The Baltic States signed a free trade 
agreement (the BAFTA) among themselves in 1995.  
Table 2. Bilateral, intra-periphery free trade agreements 
  Date of entry into force 
 EE  HU  LV  LT  PL  SL 
Czech Rep.  12 Feb 1998  –  1 Jul 1997  1 Jul 1997  –  1 Jan 1993 
Estonia  –  1 Mar 2001  –  –  –  – 
Hungary  –  –  1 Jan 2000  1 Mar 2000  –  – 
Latvia –  –  –  –  –  – 
Lithuania –  –  –  –  –  – 
Poland  –  –  1 Jun 1999  1 Jan 1997  –  – 
Slovakia  12 Feb 1998  –  1 Jul 1997  1 Jul 1997  –  – 
Slovenia  1 Jul 1997  –  1 Aug 1996  1 Mar 1997  –  – 
Source: WTO (retrieved from http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm). 
                                                 
3 The CEFTA provides a framework for bilateral agreements among seven states. More precisely, the 
CEFTA system has two components: multilateral and bilateral. A multilateral component comprises 
commonly agreed preferences, whereas a bilateral one those negotiated bilaterally and not extended to all 
CEFTA members. HUB-AND-SPOKE OR ELSE? FTAS IN AN ENLARGED EU | 5 
 
2.2  The opening up of trade in the CEECs: Some stylized facts 
To examine some features of the opening up of trade in the CEECs, Tables 3 and 4 provide 
information on bilateral trade flows coming from CEECs directed towards the centre (the EU-
15) and the periphery (the CEECs). 
In short, the features found in the trading pattern of the CEECs suggest that the share of exports 
to the EU-15 was relatively high in the first half of the 1990s, partly because of the reduction in 
trade barriers that were taking place.  
In fact after 1989, the EU applied the generalised system of preference (GSP) status to Hungary 
and Poland (1990), then to Bulgaria and the former Czechoslovakia (1991), and subsequently to 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (1992). Slovenia retained preferential status for its exports under 
the so-called ‘autonomous trade preferences’ granted by the EU to the former Yugoslavia in the 
1980 Cooperation Agreement (Table 1). The GSP status significantly improved the access of 
exporters from the CEECs to EU markets, especially, for industrial products.
4  
Following the demise of central planning and the associated collapse of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA), trade linkages among the CEECs contracted dramatically and 
still remain very weak. The share of this trade increased between 1989 and 1993 but mainly 
because of the dissolution of former Czechoslovakia.  
Table 3. Share of exports to the former centrally planned economies (CPEs)* and the EU (%) 
 CPEs**  EU 
 1988  1992  1988  1992 
Czechoslovakia** 47.7 19.7 38.4 61.8 
Hungary 43.6  7.7  39.1  75.1 
Poland  35.7 15.7 49.2 62.3 
Estonia  n.a. 29.2  n.a. 68.5 
Latvia n.a.  58  n.a.  38.5 
Lithuania  n.a. 57.8  n.a. 39.1 
* The CPEs include the former Soviet Union (including the Baltic countries), Bulgaria, former Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania.  
** Excludes intra-Czech-Slovakian trade,  
Source: Hoekman & Djankov (1996). 
The bulk of intra-CEEC trade takes place between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which 
until 1992 had been part of the same national economy. Combined exports from the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia to the CEECs (Table 4b) account for around two-thirds of intra-CEEC 
exports (Kaminsky, 2001). 
The geographical redistribution of trade flows in the period 1993-2003 in the EU-23 seems to 
have been generally in favour of the centre (EU-15). The only relative exceptions are Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia (Table 4b). With respect to the world total, data show an increase in intra-
periphery trade flows for all CEECs with the exceptions of the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
(Table 4a). 
                                                 
4 GSP preferential rates embraced 63% of all combined nomenclature tariff lines in EU imports with most 
of them (94% of GSP items) subject to zero rates. The interim trade component of the Europe 
Agreements overshadowed GSP arrangements by retaining preferential tariffs and making them 
permanent rather than subject to annual reviews (Kaminsky, 2001). 6 | DE BENEDICTIS, DE SANTIS & VICARELLI 
 
It is a very difficult task to identify with any precision the extent to which preferential access to 
EU markets was responsible for a reorientation in the geographic patterns of CEEC trade. Under 
the central planning regime, the CEECs undertraded with the EU and overtraded with each other 
and other members of the former CMEA.
5 A sizable portion of the adjustment can be attributed 
to a correction of these earlier trends.  
The shift from a supply-constrained economic regime to a demand-constrained regime, 
combined with the collapse of import demand in the CMEA countries, could have been the 
major force behind the expansion of trade between the CEECs and the EU. Nevertheless, we 
assume that the measures introduced by the EU to support transition and accelerate re-
integration of the CEECs into EU markets have also contributed to trade expansion. 
Table 4. Trade integration in the periphery versus the trade integration in the EU  
Table 4a  Percentage of the world total 
  1993 2003 
   EU/WT  C/WT  P/WT  EU/WT  C/WT  P/WT 
Czech Rep.  73  48  25  63  51  12 
Estonia* 39  30  09  81  67  14 
Hungary 35  34  1  66  60  6 
Latvia 43  33  10  83  67 16 
Lithuania 47  36  11  53 39  14 
Poland 71  67  4  77  66 11 
Slovak Rep.  79  28  51  65  46  19 
Slovenia 55  54  1  63  56  7 
Table 4b  Percentage of EU-15 + CEECs 
  1993 2003 
   C/EU  P/EU  C/EU  P/EU 
Czech Rep.  66  34  81  19 
Estonia* 64  36  83  17 
Hungary 97  3  92  8 
Latvia 76  24  81  19 
Lithuania 62  38  73  27 
Poland 94  6  86  14 
Slovak Rep.  36  64  71  29 
Slovenia 99  1  89  11 
*1994 
Notes: EU = EU-15 + CEECs; C = centre (the EU-15); P = periphery (the CEECs) 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics. 
                                                 
5  The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, (COMECON or CMEA), refers to an international 
organisation active between 1956 and 1991 for the coordination of economic policy among certain 
nations then under the Communist regime, including Albania (after 1961), Bulgaria, Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia 
participated in matters of mutual interest. Although it was formed in 1949, a formal charter was not 
ratified until 1959. The charter gave COMECON the same international status as the European Economic 
Community (Common Market), but the structure was controlled by heads of state.  HUB-AND-SPOKE OR ELSE? FTAS IN AN ENLARGED EU | 7 
 
2.3  The EU-membership factor  
Concerning the effects of EU membership, we refer to the boost that trade receives through 
movements of factors of production and other dynamic effects such as capital accumulation, 
technology transfer, increased competition and exploitation of economies of scale.  
EU membership, which also implies for these countries a commitment to a pegged exchange 
rate (ERM II) and eventually to a single currency, will likely change the international 
assessment of risk in these countries. The exchange rate stabilisation, the EU’s ‘seal of 
approval’ and the macroeconomic stabilisation programmes that accompany accession are the 
source of standard returns from a centre-peripheral type of integration to the periphery. These 
usually include increased trade flows as well as foreign direct and portfolio investment as 
investors face lower institutional and policy risks. Although it is too early to account for the 
post-accession effects of EU membership, it seems in some way reasonable to measure the 
anticipated effect of the ‘EU factor’ on bilateral trade.  
As previously noted, although the formal accession occurred in May 2004, the process began in 
the early 1990s. At the European Council summit in Copenhagen (June 1993), the EU invited 
the CEECs to accede to the EU and formulated the three accession criteria (under the headings 
of democracy, market economy and the acquis communautaire). In late 1997, Hungary, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia (the ‘Luxembourg group’) started negotiations, 
whereas the other CEECs (the ‘Helsinki group’) started in 1999. Eventually, at the European 
Council of Laeken (December 2001) the Council agreed with the European Commission’s 
report that all the candidates, with the exceptions of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, were 
suitable to join the European Union. 
We intend to test what role, if any, the pure trade and EU-membership effects had the on the 
bilateral trade flows between the CEECs and the EU-15. 
3.  Equation, empirical strategy and data description 
We introduce three sets of variables: i) gravity variables, ii) controls for heterogeneity and iii) 
controls for dynamics, as described below. Dummy variables to test the effects of FTAs on 
bilateral trade flows between the CEECs and the 23 importer countries (CEECs plus the EU-15) 
are also introduced in the estimates. 
i)  Standard gravity variables. Bilateral distance is used as a proxy for transport costs and the 
importer’s and exporter’s GDPs are used as proxies for demand and production factors 
respectively. We add to this standard specification an index of relative country size, an 
index of absolute difference in relative factor endowments (see Helpman & Krugman, 
1985) between trading partners and an exchange-rate volatility index. 
ii)  Controls for heterogeneity. Following Baltagi et al. (2003), we introduce fixed effects for 
importer and exporter countries. In contrast with their study, we do not control for country-
pair effects (i.e. the interaction effect between the exporter and importer country picking up 
unobserved characteristics of a country pair) because this kind of variable would include the 
impact of bilateral trade agreements, which we want to control by specific dummies. Again, 
as opposed to Baltagi et al. (2003), we do not introduce interaction terms between the 
exporter and importer countries and time (it and jt).
6  
                                                 
6 This approach, allowing for each country to have a separate parameter for each time period when it is an 
exporter and another one when it is an importer, leads to a maximum flexibility in the it and jt dimensions 
of the panel: all possible nation-specific variables can move unrestrictedly over time. 8 | DE BENEDICTIS, DE SANTIS & VICARELLI 
 
Following the study performed by Bun & Klaassen (2004), we instead introduce a set of 
country-pair specific time trends, the reason being that trade flows tend to grow over time.  
Although using panel data allows for time effects to correct for any residual trend common 
to all bilateral trade flows, trends may vary across country pairs. For instance, transportation 
costs depend on country-pair distance and the structure of trade; these elements vary 
between country pairs. Transportation costs have decreased over time and this could have 
increased bilateral trade flows; it is unlikely that the standard (common) trend correction 
could completely avoid omitted trend variables bias.  
As Bun & Klaassen (2004) underline, this approach is more flexible in the cross-sectional 
dimension (ij) with respect to the Baltagi et al. (2003) formulation: it allows the trade 
development over time to be driven by factors other than national ones (i.e. transportation 
costs). We impose linearity for trends (at the cost of restricting the it and jt dimensions) 
instead of allowing for unrestricted time variation (at the cost of restricting the ij 
dimension). Linear trends usually capture the most part of the trending variables. The 
estimates are also robust when we generalise the linearity hypothesis by allowing for 
quadratic trends. 
Controlling for exporter, importer and bilateral time trend effects it is possible to proxy for 
the ‘multilateral trade resistance index’ (see Anderson & van Wincoop, 2003), obtaining a 
specification of gravity equation that can be interpreted as a reduced form of a model of 
trade with micro foundations.
7 
iii)  Controls for dynamics. It is worth highlighting that when considering the time dimension, 
one should not forget that accession is a very recent phenomenon. 
Given the novelty of the phenomenon, the traditional static gravity models that generally 
deal with long-run relationships are not well-suited to interpreting the repercussions of the 
accession. For this purpose, we need to make the gravity equation more oriented to the short 
term, by explicitly introducing dynamics, controlling for the lagged effects of the dependent 
variable and detecting the short-term influences of the ‘forthcoming accession’ and of all 
the other variables affecting bilateral trade in an enlarged EU. 
Indeed, the ‘short term’ can generally be highly relevant in trade analyses, since countries 
that trade a lot with each other tend to keep on doing so. Such inertia mainly derives from 
the sunk costs exporters have to bear to set up distribution and service networks in the 
partner country, leading to the emergence of substantial entry and exit barriers (see 
Eichengreen & Irwin, 1996). This sticky behaviour seems all the more important in the case 
of the CEECs and the EU-15, where trade relationships are affected not only by past 
investment in export-oriented infrastructures, but also by the accumulation of invisible 
assets such as political, cultural and geographical factors characterising the area and 
influencing the commercial transactions taking place within it. 
It is worth noting that, notwithstanding the general importance of the ‘persistence effects’, 
quite a few studies, based on a panel estimation of gravity equations, have considered the 
possibility of controlling for them (Egger, 2000; De Grauwe & Skudelny, 2000; Bun & 
Klaassen, 2002; and De Nardis & Vicarelli, 2003).  
                                                 
7 Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) pointed out that trade between a pair of countries depends on their 
bilateral trade barriers with all trading partners: trade will be stronger for those countries with relatively 
low trade barriers. Rose & van Wincoop (2001) approximate the multilateral trade resistance index using 
country-pair fixed effects. Ritschl & Wolf (2003) and Estevadeordal et al. (2003) propose using country-
group dummies; our approach follows this suggestion. HUB-AND-SPOKE OR ELSE? FTAS IN AN ENLARGED EU | 9 
 
The introduction of dynamics into a panel data model raises an econometric problem. If 
trade is a static process, the ‘within’ estimator (fixed-effect estimator) is consistent for a 
finite time dimension T and an infinite number of country-pairs N. But if trade is a dynamic 
process, the estimate of a dynamic panel such as our model (a static one with the lagged 
dependent variable) is more difficult. The reason is that the transformation needed to 
eliminate the country-pair fixed effects produces a correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the transformed error term that (for a finite T and an infinite N) 
renders the least square estimator biased and inconsistent. 
There are alternative estimators with which to bypass this inconsistency problem. Arellano 
& Bond (1991) have suggested transforming the model into first differences and run it using 
the Hansen two-step GMM estimator. First-differencing the equation removes the random 
effects that are independent and identically distributed among individuals and produces an 
equation estimable by instrumental variables. 
As far as the gravity model is concerned, the proposed strategy is not, however, without 
cost. On the one hand, first-differencing the equation removes the fixed effects but also the 
time invariant regressors that are in the specification. If those regressors are of interest, the 
loss of information implied can be of no second order. On the other hand, the first-
differenced GMM estimator performs poorly in terms of precision if it is applied to short 
panels (along the T dimension) including highly persistent time series (Blundell & Bond, 
1998). Lagged levels of time series that have near-unit root properties are in fact weak 
instruments for subsequent first-differences. Since bilateral exports between (old and new) 
industrialised countries are expected to change sluggishly, one might suspect that this 
would affect our estimates. 
Arellano & Bover (1995) describe how, if the original equations in levels were added to the 
system of first-differenced equations, additional moment conditions could be brought to 
bear to increase efficiency. They show how the two key properties of the first-differencing 
transformation – eliminating the time-invariant individual effects while not introducing 
disturbances for periods earlier than period t-1 into the transformed error term – can be 
obtained using any alternative transformation (i.e. forward orthogonal deviations). 
Blundell & Bond (1998) articulated the necessary assumptions for this ‘system GMM’ 
estimator more precisely and tested it with Monte Carlo simulations.
8 As far as we know, 
very few studies have adopted this methodology in the context of a gravity approach.
9 
The estimated equation is:  
Ln (Expijt) = b1ln(Expijt-n) + b2ln(GDPit) + b3ln(GDPjt) + b4(SIMILijt) + 
b5(ENDOWijt) +b6ln(Dist ij) + b7VOLijt +  b8 FTAPijt + b9 FTAEUijt + b10 Entrijt + 
b11 Luxijt + b12 Helsinkiijt+ b13 αi  + b14 βj  + b15(τijt) 
where 
ln = the natural logarithm, i is the exporter country, j is the importer country and t is the 
year, n is a lag structure for the dependent variable; 
Expijt = the exports in value from country i to country j;  
GDPit = the gross domestic product of the exporter country; 
GDPjt  = the gross domestic product of the importer country;  
                                                 
8 Bond (2002) offers a good introduction to these estimators and their use. 
9 See for example De Benedictis & Vicarelli (2005). 10 | DE BENEDICTIS, DE SANTIS & VICARELLI 
 
SIMILijt = the similarity index of the GDPs of two trading partners as a measure of relative 
country size. This is calculated as: 
ln








 


 


+
−  


 


+
−
2 2
1
GDPjt GDPit
GDPjt
GDPjt GDPit
GDPit
 
where  
ENDOWijt  = the absolute difference in relative factor endowments between country-pairs. 
This is calculated as: 
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where 
POP = the population; 
VOLijt  = the exchange rate volatility between counties i and j at time t; it has been 
measured by the standard deviation of the first difference of the monthly natural 
logarithm of the bilateral nominal exchange rate at the current year y; 
Distij = the distance between country pairs; 
FTAPijt = a dummy variable that assumes the value of 0 for the absence of free trade 
agreements or customs unions among periphery countries; it assumes the value of 1 (year 
of entry into force) if these agreements are present; 
FTAEUijt = a dummy variable that assumes the value of 0 for the absence of free trade 
agreements or customs unions among the periphery and the EU-15 countries; it assumes 
the value of 1 (year of entry into force) if these agreements are present;  
Entrijt = a dummy variable embodying the ‘announcement effect’ of the entrance of the 
eight new member countries into the EU. This announcement corresponds to the date of 
European Council meeting of Laeken in December 2001; the dummy assumes the value 
of 1 since 2002 for all country pairs in the sample; 
Luxijt = a dummy variable embodying the ‘announcement-of-negotiations effect’ for 
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia; the dummy assumes the 
value of 1 for exports coming from each of these countries and 0 otherwise; 
Helsinkiijt = a dummy variable embodying the ‘announcement-of-negotiations effect’ for 
Latvia, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic; the dummy assumes a value of 1 for exports 
coming from each of these countries and 0 otherwise; 
αi = an exporter country dummy, which assumes a value of 1 if export flows come from 
exporter country i to each one of importer countries j and 0 otherwise;  
βj = an importer country dummy, which assumes a value of 1 if export flows come from 
each one of the exporter countries i to importer country j and 0 otherwise; 
τij t = the bilateral trend variables.  
The data sources for these variables are can be found in the appendix in Table A.1.  
We expect that bilateral export flows are positively influenced by a number of factors. These 
can be identified as: HUB-AND-SPOKE OR ELSE? FTAS IN AN ENLARGED EU | 11 
 
•  the lagged endogenous variable. We expect that countries trading a great deal with each 
other would continue to do so, thus reflecting entrance and exit barriers owing to sunk 
costs. 
•  the real GDP of importer and exporter countries. In gravity models, trade flows are 
positively influenced by the dimension of origin and destination countries proxied by GDP. 
•  the presence of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. These dummies proxied the 
pure trade effects and are expected to have a positive impact on trade flows. 
•  the announcements of entry into the EU. These dummies proxied the effects of the EU-
membership factor and are expected to have a positive impact on trade flows. 
We also expect that bilateral export flows are negatively influenced by tow factors: distance, 
which is used as a proxy for the transport costs and cultural proximity between two countries; 
and exchange rate volatility. 
We have no a priori expectations on the signs of relative country size index or the differences of 
factor endowments index. A positive (negative) sign of the first index and a negative (positive) 
sign of the latter could support the hypothesis that bilateral flows are higher (lower) the more 
similar two countries are (in terms of size) and the more dissimilar they are in terms of relative 
factor endowments.  
4.  Estimate results  
The equation has been estimated for the group of the eight CEECs (CEEC-8) as reporting 
countries and the EU-15 plus the eight CEECs as trading partners. Table 5 shows the results of 
the test
10 and the estimates. The autoregressive process tests AR(1) and AR(2) show the 
consistency of the GMM estimator and the inconsistency of the OLS procedure. Hence, by 
introducing dynamics, the proper estimation method is the former one. The Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions shows that the hypothesis that all moment restrictions are satisfied for 
dynamic specification is not rejected. 
Not all the regressors are statistically significant and show the expected sign; among the 
coefficients of major interest, the agreement dummy between the intra-periphery, centre and 
periphery and Luxembourg dummy coefficients are statistically significant. The ‘announcement 
effect’ dummy also seems to play a role in explaining bilateral trade flows. Further points about 
the results that deserve highlighting include: 
i)  Gravity standard variables. An inverse relationship between exports and distance is 
confirmed by the results. The sign of the exporter countries’ GDP is negative; there are big 
differences between the GDPs of the CEEC-8 countries (which are all exporters in our 
estimate), and the group of importer countries has had a detrimental role in explaining 
bilateral trade flows. The positive sign of the relative country size index and the negative 
one of the relative factor endowment index (although the latter is statistically not 
significant) confirms that trade relationships are more intense (higher) the more similar two 
countries are in terms of country size and less intense the more dissimilar two countries are 
in terms of relative factor endowments.  
                                                 
10 Arellano & Bond (1991) propose a test of the hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the 
disturbances of the first-differenced equation. This is a necessary condition for the valid instrumentation. 
The Arellano-Bond test performed for our estimate confirms that the GMM estimator is consistent. A test 
for the hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation is also reported: the rejection of the null hypothesis 
(i.e. the presence of first-order serial correlation) indicates the inconsistency of the OLS estimator. 12 | DE BENEDICTIS, DE SANTIS & VICARELLI 
 
This latter result seems to support Linder’s hypothesis, as in Baltagi et al. (2003). On the 
other hand, the positive sign of the importer countries’ GDPs is statistically significant.  
ii)  Lagged dependent variable. This variable is statistically significant until a 1-period lag; the 
magnitude of the persistence effect seems a little bit lower with respect to other findings 
based on a more integrated and developed group of countries (see De Nardis & Vicarelli, 
2003; and Bun & Klassen, 2002). This gap can be explained by the fact that the CEEC-8 as 
a group are less integrated than the EU-15 and by the inclusion of a bilateral time trend in 
the regression, capturing part of the persistence effect. 
iii)  Pure trade variables –  FTA-periphery, FTA-EU. Both of these free trade agreements 
dummies are positive and statistically significant (t=2.2, t=1,6). The coefficient shows that 
being part of a free trade agreement as opposed to not being part of one increases bilateral 
trade on average by more than 14% with respect to intra-periphery agreements and by more 
than 11% with respect to Europe Agreements.
11  
iv)  EU membership variables – EU membership, Luxembourg group and Helsinki group. The 
results for inclusion in the EU and the Luxembourg group are positive and significant, 
supporting the assumption of an anticipated effect on trade of participation in the EU’s 
Single Market. The magnitude of this effect seems to be relatively high. In contrast, the 
dummy for being part of the Helsinki group is not significant.  
Table 5. Estimate of bilateral exports coming from the CEEC-8 (1993-2003) 
Num. obs= 
1712 
Num. group=176  F (216,1495) = 441.46  Prob>F=0.000  Sample period 
1990-2003 
 Coeff.    Std.  Err.  t P>|t| 
Ln(expij) t-1  0.4455  0.088  5.03  0.000 
Ln(GDPit) -0.355  0.142  -2.50  0.013 
Ln(GDPjt) 0.195  0.087  2.23  0.026 
Ln(DISTij) -1.08  0.172  -6.30  0.000 
Ln(SIMILijt) 0.149 0.054  2.75  0.006 
ENDOWijt -0.047  0.063  -0.75  0.455 
VOLijt -0.06  0.075  -0.84  0.402 
FTAEUijt   0.105  0.064  1.63  0.103 
FTAPijt   0.135  0.062  2.16  0.031 
Entrijt 0.095  0.036  2.60  0.010 
Luxijt 0.095  0.052  1.84  0.066 
Helsijt 0.008  0.063  0.13  0.894 
￿￿ Yes  –  –  – 
￿j Yes  –  –  – 
￿ij t  Yes  –  –  – 
Notes: Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -5.71 Pr>z = 0.000; Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences: z = 0.08 Pr>z = 0.934; Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions: chi2 (63) = 62.38 Prob> chi2 
=0.498. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
                                                 
11 Since the parameters of the dummy FTA are respectively 0.135 and 0.105, the variation of trade 
induced by being part of a trade agreement (FTA=1) as opposed to not being part of any agreement 
(FTA=0), i.e. [(EXP equals being part of a trade agreement and /EXP equals not being part of a trade. 
agreement) -1]x100 is given, other things being equal, by [(e0.135x1/ e0.135x0) –1]x100=14.4% and 
[(e0.105x1/ e0.105x0) –1]x100=11.1%. HUB-AND-SPOKE OR ELSE? FTAS IN AN ENLARGED EU | 13 
 
5. Conclusion 
According to the findings of the study and the previous section in particular, the following 
conclusions can be drawn. First, with regard to pure trade effects, free trade agreements are 
important in explaining bilateral export flows coming from the CEECs: trade agreement 
dummies are positive and statistically significant.  
Second, being a party to an FTA with the EU-15 (through the Europe Agreements) increased 
the CEECs’ bilateral trade by more than 11%, while intra-periphery agreements increased trade 
by around 14% on average. The relatively lower impact of Europe Agreements on export flows 
compared with intra-periphery agreements could be explained by the fact that from the end of 
the 1980s, trade flows between the CEECs and the EU-15 had already increased owing to the 
reduction of trade barriers that had taken place. 
Moreover, the trade regime that had dominated the CMEA (and for a while after its collapse in 
1991) meant that trade between the CEECs had not been driven by economic factors and were 
underdeveloped. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the introduction of FTAs and RTAs 
were able to restore and develop trade relations within a broader EU framework. 
It is notable that the estimate results seem to support the evidence coming from the data (see 
section 2). Starting from a very low level, the rate of growth of intra-periphery trade has been 
higher than core-periphery trade, ceteris paribus, because of a higher impact from the FTA. 
From this perspective, trade agreements between the centre and periphery did not hamper the 
trade relationships among periphery countries, while the CEFTA and BAFTA helped to limit 
the emergence of a hub-and-spoke relationship between the CEECs and the EU. 
These results have important policy implications for the trade strategy of EU candidate 
countries in south-eastern Europe as well as in the southern Mediterranean. According to the 
empirical results, these countries should move towards a regional free trade area as exemplified 
by the Central European Free Trade Agreement and the Baltic Free Trade Agreement to avoid 
hub-and-spoke effects. 
Concerning the EU-membership factor, the dummies for inclusion in the Luxembourg group 
and the EU are positive and significant, suggesting that in both cases the trade flows coming 
from CEECs have already factored in the effects of news about forthcoming EU membership. 
Nevertheless, the attempt to further estimate the effect of accession by means of the introduction 
of exchange rate volatility did not yield any significant results.  
14 | 
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Table A.1. Sources and definitions of variables 
Variables Sources  Sample  period 
Bilateral export 
flows 
(current price, $US 
millions) 
Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF  1990-2003 
Free trade 
agreement 
European Commission and the WTO  1990-2003 
GDP (current price 
$US millions) 
World Economic Outlook database, IMF  1990-2003 
Distance  Brenton & Di Mauro (1999)  1990-2003 
Population  Queen database, Eurostat  1992-2003 
GDP per capita  Queen database, Eurostat  1992-2003 
Exchange rate  International Financial Statistics, IMF and ECB  1992-2003 
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